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Abstract
Increased reliance on wearables using Bluetooth
requires additional security and privacy measures to
protect these devices and personal data, regardless of
device vendor. Most wearables lack the ability to
monitor their communication connections and protect
personal data without assistance. Attackers can force
wearables to disconnect from base stations. When a
wearable loses its connection to its base station, an
attacker can connect to the wearable to steal stored
personal data or await reconnection to the base station
to eavesdrop on communications. If the base station
inadvertently disconnects from the cloud serving a
security-aware app, it would be unable to respond to a
rapid change in the security of its current environment.
We design a personal fog incorporating wearables, a
base station, and the cloud that allows the wearable to
be situationally aware and manage inter- and intra-fog
communications, given local personal fogs with the
same app.

1. Introduction
Bluetooth devices, such as wearables, have become
ubiquitous in day-to-day life. With this ubiquity comes
a rush to get devices to market quickly, often at the
cost of good security and privacy standards. Many of
the devices currently available use the basic built-in
Bluetooth security. While this has been improved over
each new version of the Bluetooth security standard,
there are many known holes in the previous and current
standard [7] to necessitate a method of preventing an
attacker from gaining personal information from user
devices. Additionally, with an Ubertooth One [8], an
open-source hardware device capable of intercepting
Bluetooth transmission, and crackle [2], an opensourced software program which can decrypt Bluetooth
communication packets, an attacker can gain personal
data by intercepting device communications using the
built-in Bluetooth standards.
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Without additional security features, many devices
are open to interference from malicious users. For
example, an attacker can force the disconnection of a
wearable from its base station. Once disconnected, the
attacker can intercept the pairing packets and gain a
user’s personal information without any alert to the
user. This method can be exploited to great effect if the
wearable is transmitting very sensitive data. If
wearables rely only on default Bluetooth standards,
they won’t be equipped to prevent attackers from using
this exploit. More advanced wearables, such as the
Apple Watch 2, can operate for some period without
connection to their base station. As these
advancements proliferate, they open additional attack
vectors for disconnected, but still operable, wearables.
If a base station connected to a wearable has a
method of recognizing its environments’ insecurity, it
would still have major issues in practical use. First, it
would need to rely heavily on users informing the
application that they are unsafe in their current
environment. This makes this solution far less effective
for users that do not have the expertise to properly
evaluate the risk present in their current environment.
However, users without the proper expertise could
rely on cloud-computed rules that dictate which
environments are unsafe. These rules could be
computed from data that is provided to our application
by users who are particularly security conscious. Even
with enough security conscious users, there are no
guarantees that users would be able to receive updates
to their application to utilize the new rules being
created as there are many situations where users would
have poor-to-no cloud-connectivity. In environments
where users cannot receive updated rules it is possible
that they would be transmitting personal data even
though their environment had already been deemed
unsafe by the cloud. Finally, as most current wearables
are unable to differentiate if a connected device is truly
secure, any information stored on the device could be
requested by an attacker who connected to a
disconnected wearable.
To increase the security of these devices, we need
wearables that are capable of better managing their
own Bluetooth connections without requiring direct
user involvement. Relieving the security and
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situational awareness burden from the user requires
management facilities such as knowledge of the
devices to which it is currently connected, the ability to
establish new connections to other devices that are not
its base station, refuse incoming connections, and
terminate established connections. This additional
computing power on the edge (i.e. at the wearable)
would allow the introduction of these facilities to
increase personal security and privacy of wearable
operation and data.
Even with this added power at the edge, current
consumer wearables require unique APIs for use with
each device, requiring developers to create applications
with different code when a new device is introduced.
This makes it difficult to develop a generic solution
which will work on multiple devices, and necessitates
looking at the direction wearables are moving.
In this paper, we introduce a concept of a personal
fog computing system as part of the quantified self. It
requires elevating a wearable to a computational
device, which has already been shown to be feasible
with the Apple Watch 2. Adding computational power
to the edge via the wearable, a personal fog introduces
wearable autonomy for security protection. This
architecture contrasts with most of today’s wearables,
which solely rely on their base station.
A personal fog has additional benefits. Situational
awareness can be enhanced by creating a security app,
downloadable by a wearable, where nearby personal
fog networks can detect app advertisement and inform
another’s wearable when a social environment is
insecure. If a wearable becomes disconnected from its
base station, either inadvertently or maliciously, we
describe a method for temporarily fostering wearable
devices in nearby personal fogs that share the security
app. Fostering, in this scenario, means sending a single
packet to “quiet” a rogue wearable in an insecure
environment until it can reconnect to its base station.
The app also allows the home base station to quiet its
wearables. We demonstrate how this solution works by
implementing it in a small-scale testing environment
and simulating a large-scale application. We analyze
our application as it relates to the CIA triad of
confidentiality, integrity, and availability.

2. Background
Kattepur et al. [6] examined the use of fog
computing to improve battery life and network
communication speed of robots performing a
computationally intensive task. Using the fog, they
improved latency of communication by 77% when
sorting information and they achieved a 54%
improvement to battery life. This method shows the

improvements that are possible even with similar
processing power at each level of the fog, as the same
robots were used for all fog layers. They did not test
their solution in the real world, however, so it is
possible issues which could not be simulated may
occur when attempting to use this method.
Hong et al. [5] describe a generic fog system
allowing custom code to be loaded into general fog
machines based on their location via a simple appkey.
This system allows developers to deploy their systems
to fog devices which are already in the locations they
are targeting. This system would allow our solution to
adapt to security threats more quickly. However, their
only test of their system was in simulation.
Vaquero and Rodero-Merino [9] provide a useful
definition of what the fog really is. Their discussion on
what it means to be a fog is vital to the development of
the fog. They settled on a model needing ubiquitous
devices communicating with each other to perform
storage and processing automatically, rewarding users
who allow their devices to be part of this system. Yi et
al. [12] provided a survey of fog computing concepts,
applications, and potential issues in design and
implementation of a fog computing system based on
this definition.
Giang et al. [4] designed a flexible fog computing
model for use with VANETs. Because VANETs suffer
from high latency, using the fog by including
processing on the edge would limit the amount of data
which needs to be transmitted and, because of the
proximity to processing nodes, lowers the latency of
the communication between car and network. This
paper does not address the issue with a network where
nodes drop in and out.
There has been work on wearable devices in
situations which may require our automatic method of
quieting devices. Abie and Balasingham [1] focused on
the creation of a framework for Internet of Things
devices in the healthcare industry. Their system
focused on wearable sensors communicating with a
smartphone which would pass this data on to a
healthcare professional. This system would be a prime
target for attackers wishing to steal personal data and
would likely include many users who are not conscious
of Bluetooth security practices. This type of system
directly motivated this work.

3. Prior efforts
3.1. Original solution
Previously, we created an application specific to the
Apple iPhone that adapted the state of its Bluetooth
communications based on the perceived security of its
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current environment [10]. The application collects as
much data as it can from the iPhone and its connected
wearables to determine if it is in an insecure
environment. Once informed of a potential threat, the
iPhone maintains a connection to the wearable but does
not send additional information or request information
from the wearable until it detected or is informed it is
in a secure environment. Maintaining the connection
without information sharing requires the sending of
exclusively empty packets. An example is shown in
Figure 1. In this case, the phone is in an insecure
environment only for communication with a Bluetooth
headset and was considered secure if the headset was
not connected, as seen in Figure 1a. Once the headset
was connected however, the phone recognized the
insecure environment and stopped sending data to the
now connected Bluetooth headset, as seen in Figure 1b.
This method is viable primarily because wearables
contain storage on the device to collect data when a
device is disconnected from its base station. Thus, the
application can stop sending data without losing any
important information the wearable might still collect.
Different wearables have different amounts of storage
for their data, but most can store more than two days’
worth of data before overwriting.

Figure 1. iPhone application a) before
adaptation and b) after adaptation
There were issues with this method. First, we chose
to work with the Apple iPhone, as it is seen by
developers as the most restrictive platform for app
development and it is widely used by consumers.
Porting the application to less restrictive OSs proved
difficult. For example, the Android framework does
not allow for specific knowledge of connected
Bluetooth devices at runtime, requiring workarounds to
learn what devices are connected.

3.2. Adding the cloud
To provide a more variable ruleset for wearable
adaptation while in an insecure environment and
introduce crowd-sourcing to improve and hasten
wearable knowledge regarding such environments, we
extended our app to use cloud-based machine learning
algorithms to adjust to newly-forming insecure
environments [11]. This method allowed the app to
operate regardless of connection to the cloud, as all
rules would be stored on the device and updated when
a connection could be reestablished.
The app took a snapshot of its current state at
regular intervals. Snapshots included the connected
devices, all information available to the phone, either
from the wearable (e.g. heartrate) or from the phone
itself (e.g. time), and the current security state of the
environment. The snapshots were passed to our cloudbased machine learning algorithm, which would use
existing snapshots to learn to identify potential
insecure environments. The results of this learning
were then translated into rules for use in our app.
Our approach stored all rules on a single cloud
service which was queried periodically to see if the
current environment was secure. This method was
accurate when predicting if an environment was
insecure and, with the low risk of Wi-Fi encryption
being broken for secure communication, making it a
good option for predicting if the phones current
environment is insecure.
While the use of a cloud-based machine learning
algorithm improved the speed at which newly insecure
environments were discovered, it still allowed for a
window of time where devices were susceptible. For
example, if an attacker is sniffing Bluetooth traffic in a
coffee shop, the cloud would not be able to truly adapt
to this problem quickly. It would only allow those who
told the app they were insecure to be secure until the
cloud was able to “catch up” and tell the other users.
Thus, an attacker can stay in one place and collect
information from users who believe they are secure
until the cloud is able to recognize the newly insecure
environment. Once discovered, the attacker is free to
move to a new location which is marked by the cloud
as secure and start eavesdropping on the
communications there.
Another issue with this extension was the inability
of our app to work for all Bluetooth devices. Because
many Bluetooth device manufacturers create custom
APIs for interacting with their devices, we were forced
to create custom code for each device tested. While it
was possible to prevent communication with these
devices, the lack of a generalized Bluetooth API
prevented us from creating an app that would work
with every Bluetooth device currently on the market.
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3.3. Addressing confidentiality, integrity, and
availability

the wearable be in an insecure environment, it will not
transmit any personal information which may lead to
the user of the wearable being identified.

Our previous app focused on the confidentiality and
integrity of wearable data by preventing data which
may be intercepted from being transmitted in insecure
environments. In both our original solution and the
improved cloud-based solution, we maintained the
focus on confidentiality and integrity of the data by
protecting what was streamed from a wearable device
to its base station. The drawback is that the data is not
immediately available when the wearables are forced
to send empty packets.

4. Designing the personal fog
4.1. Increasing wearable computational power
Informing users of a potentially insecure
environment should be done as rapidly as possible,
especially when they are trusting an app to have this
knowledge. Relying solely on a cloud service based on
crowd sourcing means such an app would assume it
was secure until enough users determined they were
insecure for our cloud service to learn of a new
insecure environment. This type of service also
requires large numbers of users to be engaged in their
environment and recognize potential insecurities. In
addition, it requires constant connectivity to obtain
information from the cloud and to prevent an attacker
from accessing data stored on a “quieted” wearable.
To address these pitfalls while retaining the
benefits of the prior work, we extend our app,
including the cloud service usage, to a new
computation and communication model. Moving the
traditional quantified-self architecture to a personal fog
is illustrated in Figure 2. The difference in the models
appears slight, but the personal fog capitalizes on edge
computing to increase Bluetooth security and privacy.
The new model allows for rapid communication of
insecure environments while focusing on the privacy of
a user’s personal identifying information, moving some
of the burden of situational awareness from the user to
the wearable. By increasing the computational power
on the edge, the wearables can become aware of other
wearables using the app, as well as their state if
disconnected, either from the cloud or their base
station. This increased computational power also
allows the wearable to process data by checking
against XML rules provided by the app and stored on
the device based on the sensor capabilities of the
wearable. For example, if a wearable has access to
heartrate sensors, any rules related to heartrate will be
stored on the device and checked to ensure that, should

Figure 2. Left - current quantified-self model
Right - personal fog with wearables model
Where the traditional quantified-self has its edge
devices as the phones, wearable edge devices with
increased computing power can now process the data
collected from their own sensors before sending that
information to the phone. Unlike our previous work,
this allows the wearable to package its snapshot
information separately from the phone. The phone can
perform additional data processing on the stream of
information it is receiving, such as compressing the
snapshots from the wearable device or checking device
specific security rules, before sending to the cloud. As
before, the cloud will return information on the
predicted security of the phone and the wearables
environment, along with learned security rules for the
devices to follow. With that information, the phone can
secure itself, as before. However, with increased
wearable processing power, we can push security and
privacy information directly to the wearables, allowing
for finer grained adaptations at the edge.
Another benefit of the personal fog concept is the
increased ability to ensure wearables can operate
securely in insecure environments by incorporating
wearable situational awareness and intelligence of their
current security state. If wearables are connected to
their base station when they enter an insecure
environment, the method previously used works to
control transmission. However, it poses a problem if
the wearable inadvertently disconnects from its base
station before entering an insecure environment. In this
case, the wearable would have no knowledge of its
environmental state and could allow an attacker to
connect and request data directly from the device.
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Without information about its current state, the
disconnected, and more powerful, wearable could not
stop its communication. Our approach to resolve this
issue is to enable wearables to communicate with valid
base stations external to their initial fog, while still
maintaining privacy and adapting without divulging
any personal information. We label this interaction as
fostering fog devices and describe a design and
implementation of how it can be performed.

stations in the area advertising the app service. If a
base station which is in an insecure environment
receives a fostering request, it will inform the wearable
of the state of the environment to which the wearable
will respond by adapting its state. The devices will
then disconnect.

4.2. Fostering devices between fogs
Similar to VANETs [4], we establish dynamic
computational networks between personal fogs to
perform the fostering. We provide no guarantees that
specific connections will remain static or that the
topology of our fog networks will remain the same
over time. The objective is to implement a network that
is flexible while remaining true to the fog computing
paradigm. However, unlike many other applications of
the fog, our specific problem domain can contain a
multitude of fog networks each with unknown and
non-rigid topologies.
We have designed a set of protocols for fostering
that use nearby personal fog networks to better aid the
security of our app users by allowing, not only
temporary connections between either two nodes in the
same personal fog network, but also between two
nodes that do not share a personal fog network. The
temporary connections made by fostering last only
long enough to inform the disconnected node of a
potentially insecure environment before disconnecting,
ensuring no transfer of personally identifying
information between the nodes.
Our communication protocols create temporary
connections in one of three ways.
• Foster a disconnected wearable with nearby
base station
• Foster a base station disconnected from the
cloud with a nearby base station
• Allow two disconnected wearables in the same
fog to directly communicate
4.2.1. Wearable fostering. To secure wearable
devices that become disconnected from their base
station, as seen in Figure 3, we have designed a
protocol that would allow for connected personal fog
networks to temporarily foster another network’s
disconnected wearable device. Through this protocol,
base stations in each personal fog network can accept
incoming connection requests to foster a disconnected
wearable by advertising an app specific service known
to all devices running our app.
When a wearable becomes disconnected from its
base station, it first attempts to discover other base

Figure 3. Wearable fostering. Left shows an
unsafe personal fog (purple), right shows a
disconnected fog device (green) being
fostered
4.2.2. Base station fostering. If a base station is
having trouble connecting to the cloud for new
updates, it will attempt to establish a connection with
the base station of another personal fog network in the
vicinity, as seen in Figure 4. The disconnected base
station attempts to discover nearby base stations
advertising the app specific service. Once a connection
has been established, the base stations can share with
each other their knowledge about the environment and
adapt their state, as well as the state of their personal
fog. Such communication events could be triggered
through one base station receiving an update from the
cloud, from user input, or from another personal fog
network if one of the networks were to have multiple
external base station connections.

Figure 4. Fostering a base station. Left shows
an unsafe personal fog network (purple)
communicating this to an unaware network
(green) on right
With this same method, certain base stations can
have embedded app rules to be proactive and use the
advertised service to alert other nearby personal fog
networks that the environment is unsafe, for quicker
adaptation. Base stations are not required to reflect the
changes proposed by other personal fog networks, but
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through this protocol each user can make more
informed decisions about the risk present to their own
wearable devices given the alerts received when using
our app.
4.2.3. Intra-fog fostering. Sibling wearables in a
single personal fog can connect to one another, as seen
in Figure 5 to share security awareness. Typically, all
wearables in a personal fog are connected to a base
station within that network. These base stations are
responsible for quieting the wearables in the network if
the environment is deemed to be unsafe (as discussed
in Section 3). However, if some of the wearables
become disconnected from their base station then it is
possible that they would not be properly quieted when
the other wearables are, which can increase
vulnerability to attack at both the wearable and the
personal fog.

unique to its personal fog, such as MAC addresses, a
pre-shared unique ID of its personal fog, and a preshared unique key known only to the base station and
the device itself. While some of this information, such
as the MAC address and basic device information, is
publicly available through a Bluetooth information
request, the specific ID of the personal fog service and
the pre-shared key should only be known to trusted
devices and, being 128 bits long, are essentially not
guessable by an attacker. We maintain the same level
of confidentiality of our original app with the fostering
approach. It increases the availability of our app data
by dispersing the responsibility of informing base
stations and wearable devices of an insecure
environment. This way, should there be a
disconnection from the cloud or a rapid change in the
environment, our app is able to maintain its availability
for local sharing. By restricting fostering to quieting a
device, we ensure the integrity of our app data. It is not
possible for an attacker to claim they are safe and
prevent the app from recognizing an existing unsafe
environment, as the app will continue to try to foster
with other base stations in the area.

5. Implementation
Figure 5. Intra-fog communication. Right
shows a wearable (purple) informing its fog
neighbor (green) it is unsafe
To prevent this situation, after a wearable has been
quieted from a base station outside its personal fog, it
subsequently attempts to establish a connection to its
sibling wearable devices to inform them of the change
in the environment. Wearable devices in each personal
fog network advertise a unique service known only to
members of that personal fog, restricting discovery.
Once a wearable device has been quieted, it can
attempt to discover other wearables which have not
been quieted through this advertising. This
communication technique is also useful if multiple
wearables in the same fog become disconnected
simultaneously and become fostered by different base
stations. Following this protocol, disconnected siblings
can work together to better secure the wearables of
their own personal network.

4.3. Addressing confidentiality, integrity, and
availability
An important thing to note about our system is that
only wearable’s original base station may inform it that
it is safe again, because it has knowledge of properties

To illustrate the communication protocol within a
personal fog, we rely on the Bluetooth wearable
testbed. This testbed, seen in Figure 6, is composed of
three Raspberry Pi 3s, which can simulate currently
available wearable devices using the Sense HAT addon, USB connection of sensors, and built-in Bluetooth
capabilities. The testbed provides extra processing
power and Wi-Fi communication capabilities above
current wearable technology. This additional
processing power means a Raspberry Pi can be a client
or a server at any given time, which allows the
Raspberry Pis to simulate both the wearable edge and
the base station within a personal fog. Using the
Raspberry Pi as a simulated wearable, we avoid issues
with proprietary APIs. By simulating the base station,
we remove the need to port our application and
experiments to different phones. The Raspberry Pi that
is simulating the phone layer can communicate through
Wi-Fi to the cloud, giving us a full simulation of each
layer of our personal fog, as shown in Figure 2.
We implemented our original app (from Section 3)
onto the Raspberry Pis, which migrated it to the
personal fog, using devices B and C in Figure 6 to act
as wearable devices connected to device A, which acts
as the phone or base station. To implement our app, we
used the Pybluez python library to handle the
Bluetooth communication between the devices. After
validating the app functionality on the hardware, we
then forced a communication disruption with a
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command from either the cloud or the phone,
designating device C to represent either the base
station or a wearable device that is disconnected,
depending on the fostering solution we target. We
assume from this point on that all devices are
communicating from within our app using the same
service ID and, when in the same personal fog, using a
private personal fog service ID.

Figure 6. Three Raspberry Pi 3s used to test
our solution

5.1. Fostering a wearable
As described in Section 4.2, the personal fog we
construct allows for three types of fostering – wearable
fostering by a base station, base station fostering by
another base station, and wearable fostering by another
wearable. We first examine wearable fostering by a
base station. When a wearable (recall that it is a
Raspberry Pi on the personal fog edge in our
architecture) disconnects from its original base station,
it can seek to be fostered by another base station
(another Raspberry Pi) to discover the current
environment’s security state. It first sends an inquiry to
all discoverable Bluetooth devices in range, asking for
the services running on the devices. It may receive
multiple responses, which when parsed identify valid
base stations.
The wearable attempts to connect to the one of the
valid base stations by sending a connection request as
shown in the sequence diagram in Figure 7. If the base
station is its original one, it will attempt connection
with that first. If this reconnection is unsuccessful, it
will choose another valid base station that responded.

Because of the fluidity of the environment, it only
waits 5 seconds for a base station response before
choosing a new one to foster with. If all choices are
exhausted, it waits 1 minute before inquiring again.
When a base station receives a connection request
from a wearable, it accepts the connection to begin
fostering. Fostering occurs when the base station
signals the wearable that the environment is “unsafe”.
After sending this message, the base station does not
accept any data communication from the wearable
other than what is shown in Figure 7 in the
confirmation (reply) packet to maintain security within
the base station. If the wearable attempts to send
unexpected information, our app assumes it is an
attacker attempting to gain access to the base station,
which alerts its user regarding the unsafe environment,
and quiets its personal fog.
Once the wearable sends its confirmation packet, it
disconnects and quiets itself, making it invisible to
devices that have not already attempted a connection to
it. It stores all sensor information it collects to be
broadcast to its base station when it is properly
reconnected. When quieted, our app on the wearable
refuses all connection attempts that are not from its
original base station, as described in Section 4.3.
Fostering does not occur if the base station informs
the wearable that the environment is “safe”. With this
information, the wearable does not initially assume that
it is truly in a secure environment because the base
station could be used by an attacker. In this case, the
wearable does not provide any personal information to
the potential attacker, as the attacker does not know the
service ID used by the fostered devices personal fog.
Instead, the wearable attempts to connect to other valid
base stations. If no base station identified in the first
inquiry informs the wearable that it is unsafe, the
wearable remains active and accepts communication
from devices which attempt connection using the
service ID unique to its personal fog, which we
describe in Section 5.3.
To validate this solution, we set up a personal fog
containing device B (Figure 6) as a wearable device
and device A as the base station for one user. Device C
represents another user’s wearable which lost contact
with its base station. Once device C recognizes its
disconnection, it attempts find a base station to foster
with. When a base station is found, it attempts to
connect. Upon connection, A informs C that the state
of the current environment is unsafe. C stops all
transmission and remains in a state awaiting
reconnection. A second experiment has A inform C
that the state of the current environment is safe. Since
there are no other base stations available, C does not
send information to A and remains actively collecting
data until it can transmit it to its base station.
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Figure 7. Wearable fostering protocol when environment is unsafe

5.2. Fostering a base station
In some instances, wearables may remain
connected to their base station, but the base station
might not be informed that their environment is
“unsafe.” This might be due to a missed update from
the cloud or an attacker changing environments.
To better secure personal devices and utilize local
expertise, base stations from separate fog networks can
connect to each other, as a form of fostering, to inform
one another of perceived changes in the environment.
For example, if a security conscious user, located in
a coffee shop, noticed a potential attacker or threat, a
user employing our app will designate himself as
unsafe, thus shutting off the communication of
personal data within his or her personal fog network.
However, other personal fog networks in the area
managed by less aware users, which run the app, might
not be immediately privy to the potential threat.
Fostering introduces the awareness to share this
knowledge through the temporary connection of base
stations in distinct personal fogs.
Once a base station has switched to “unsafe” mode
and communicated the state to its personal fog, it runs
an inquiry to discover other base stations in the area.
Responding base stations treat this unsafe base station
as a wearable and accept a connection, expecting to
foster the device. Our unsafe base station sends
“unsafe” to the fostering base station, as shown in
Figure 7. Because the external base station is not
expecting information in a confirmation packet it
assumes it is unsafe and informs the user, currently

with a pop-up notification, that it may be in an insecure
environment. The user is then given the choice to
ignore the situation and continue sending and receiving
personal information from their personal fog or to heed
the warning and quiet its personal fog devices.
To validate this solution, we shifted the device C
(Figure 6) into a base station configuration and
connected a Bluetooth speaker playing music to it. We
then set the primary fog devices, A and B, into an
insecure environment. The primary fog immediately
attempted to connect to device C and sent an unsafe
message. Upon receipt, we heeded the warning and
stopped communication, causing our Bluetooth speaker
to stop receiving music while remaining connected.

5.3. Intra-fog synchronization
Fostering wearables and fostering base stations
provide two scenarios where devices from two
independent fog networks might establish inter-fog
communications to share security information about
the environment. Once inter-fog fostering has occurred
for a wearable and it has quieted itself due to an
“unsafe” message, intra-fog fostering can be used to
propagate its knowledge to the wearables within its
original personal fog. Intra-fog synchronization, or
wearable to wearable fostering, is needed if the base
station of personal fog in question has not received the
unsafe information or a wearable receives an “unsafe”
message through fostering after being disconnected
from the base station.
For this type of fostering, the previously fostered
wearable with the “unsafe” knowledge performs an
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inquiry specifically looking for wearables with the
private service ID known only to members of its
personal fog. It connects to all wearables that respond
and sends them the "unsafe” message. This protocol is
different from what is shown in Figure 7 because the
wearable sending the inquiry is also the wearable
sending the “unsafe” message. In this case, the
receiving wearable reacts as if it is receiving the
message from a fostering base station. Thus, it quiets
itself and disconnects.
To maliciously use the intra-fog communication
method, an attacker would need to know the private
fog service ID. As this ID is not shared publicly, it is
unlikely they will be able to access it. If the attacker
somehow manages to gain access to this private ID,
they are only able to quiet the wearables of the
personal fog, preventing any personal information from
being obtained by the attacker.
To validate intra-fog communication on the
architecture, we set our three Raspberry Pis (Figure 6)
up as one fog with two wearables, B and C, with A, as
a base station connected to a Bluetooth speaker. Once
device A became insecure, it connected to one of the
wearable devices, in this case device B, and told them
it was insecure. Device B immediately became
insecure and attempted to connect to device C which
was in its fog. After connecting on the service unique
to its fog, it told the device C it was unsafe and device
C stopped all communication. After changing the
service on device A so it was seen as a member of the
fog belonging to devices B and C, we told them they
were secure again and all devices began functioning
normally.

5.4. Addressing confidentiality, integrity, and
availability
By design, our fostering app maintains our original
apps focus on confidentiality. We maintain the
integrity of the wearable date using our fostering
approach by only acting on unsafe messages and
disconnecting from a fostering device after only one
message. Our app remains available to those around it
through the base stations at all times, but will not allow
an attacker to gain any information because of the
instant disconnection. In addition, data and knowledge
of unsafe environments increases availability than in
the prior solution.

6. Evaluation
While we can demonstrate a working prototype, we
need to show that a real-world application is possible
moving forward. To do this, we need to show that, for

a given area, we can ensure that all or most devices
running our application can foster their wearables, if
needed, with at least one other device. To test how this
would work in a real-world environment, we created a
simulation which allowed users with Bluetooth
wearables to move around a pre-set environment. We
allowed modification of the Bluetooth communication
range, the number of users of our app, the size of the
area the users were in, and the speed at which users
could move.
We tested this method on three different sized
locations, 10001000 ft., 500500 ft., and 250250 ft.,
with 10, 30, 50, and 100 users in the area with the app.
We define a time-step as every 2 seconds and assume
that each user can move a maximum of 25 ft. per time
step, which puts us at the maximum speed of 8.5 miles
per hour. This speed is about average running pace of
an adult. This speed does not flood the network with
data, a concern in a crowded environment sending
information to the cloud via Wi-Fi, but is also fast
enough that we are able to ensure that we do not miss
any connections that may be made between moving
devices. We also assume a Bluetooth range of 50 ft.,
which is well within consistent Bluetooth
communication range, which can range from less than
33 ft. all the way up to 328 ft., with most devices
hitting between 33 and 60 ft. [3]. Each simulation was
run for a total of 40 seconds, or 20 time-steps. We ran
each setting 100 times to average out any
inconsistencies that may occur in individual runs.
The results of this simulation can be seen in Table
1. As we should expect, the more crowded a general
area is, the more often all nodes are able to connect to
at least one other node within 40 seconds. This
connection shares only one thing, if the fog is in a
secure environment or not. No other personal
information is shared between devices or fogs.
It is important to note that each of the sizes we
tested is larger than an average coffee shop. This
shows that, even for a relatively low number of users,
our application is viable for almost any traditional
retail location. In fact, our smallest tested size,
250250 ft., is more square footage than an acre of
land. Even with this huge size, we still only had 4.7%
of devices fail to connect to another device over 100
runs of our simulation with as few as 10 users.
Table 1. Percentage of nodes which failed to
connect to at least one other node
% of Nodes Never
Connected
250
Size of
500
Location
1000

Number of Users
10
30
50
4.7 0.333333
0.04
32.7
5.5
1.5
72.5 38.03333
21

100
0
0.18
5.3
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7. Conclusion and future work

8. References

In this paper, we extended our previous work
regarding Bluetooth privacy and security in insecure
environments by introducing the concept of a personal
fog to respond to potential security or privacy threats
more quickly. Additionally, we introduced the concept
of fostering fogs to allow for expert opinions of
insecure environments, allowing co-located users of
our application to respond to newly developing threats
more quickly. Finally, we showed our application is
feasible on wearable devices which have control of
Bluetooth communication by testing our application on
a testbed built using Raspberry Pi 3s, and showed the
feasibility of our app in the wild at various user
densities.
This app still has room for improvement. Primarily,
it is still possible for an attacker to prevent a large
group of users from communicating with their
wearable devices by using our app and claiming they
are insecure. While this is not a problem from a data
interception standpoint, it could cause users to stop
trusting our app if they are always being told they are
unsafe. Additionally, our app does require an existing
user base with at least some users being security
conscious enough to recognize unsafe environments
where an attacker may be eavesdropping. Without a
somewhat large initial security conscious user base, it
is possible for an attacker to flood the system with
“safe” signals at a given location and ensure our app
would never recognize the insecurity of that location.
Moving forward, we plan to continue working with
the concept of a personal fog with wearable devices,
their base station, and the cloud to provide increased
data security and privacy in insecure environments. We
plan to examine our fog system with wearable devices
which connect to additional sensors. This behavior is
already being seen in consumer devices, such as the
Apple Watch and AirPods.
There is also a need for greater analysis of our
fostering method to ensure that no additional security
threats are introduced, including an attacker being able
to lower battery life of wearable devices through
attacking a device with this app running on it. As there
is currently not a formal definition of trust in relation
to Bluetooth device communication, this research
would greatly benefit from a study examining this. As
Bluetooth is always improving, this research will need
to be updated with newer versions of the Bluetooth
standard to ensure that no new security holes are
created. This includes looking into security issues
arising from Bluetooth 5G. Finally, there is a need to
examine possible security attacks on wearable devices
more deeply and how our method can be used to
provide additional security and privacy to a user.
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